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Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation
Joseph W. Mead – Cleveland State University
Most discussions of the policy context for nonprofits in the United States focus on federal
or state restrictions. Fundraising charities, however, must comply not only with myriad
state requirements but an uncertain number of local requirements as well. Based on a
survey of the largest cities in the United States, I find that all of these cities have some
restrictions on charitable solicitation. Several of the cities also impose extensive
registration requirements and other restrictions. These findings highlight the need for
nonprofits to be aware of local regulation of their activities.
Keywords: Nonprofit Policy, Fundraising, Charitable Solicitation
Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation
“Public fundraising is widely seen as a natural right of charitable organizations” (Hu & Guo, 2016,
p. 213). From an organizational perspective, charitable solicitation—i.e., communication seeking
a donation—is an important mechanism by which organizations that are reliant on voluntary
action sustain themselves. At a macro level, charitable solicitation reflects a literal marketplace of
ideas where organizations pitch their causes in order to receive support from the public. These
pitches can include things such as applying for grants; mailing, emailing, or telephoning former
or future donors; engaging in media marketing campaigns; or including a donation button on
their website or social media platform.
Most states regulate charitable solicitation in some way, whether through point-of-solicitation
disclosure requirements, registration mandates, or laws against fraud (Barber & Farwell, 2016a,
b; Dietz, Barber, Lott, & Shelly, 2017; Sullivan, 2004). Although revenue generation can take
many forms, charitable solicitation laws are usually limited to requests for donation rather than
attempts to raise money through the sale of merchandise. Some efforts to regulate charitable
solicitation have been controversial. These efforts have led to difficult questions about the
enforceability, cost, and constitutionality of charitable solicitation regulation (Breen, 2009;
Fishman, 2015; Inazu, 2009).
Although a great deal of literature has focused on state laws that regulate charitable solicitation,
the local regulation of charitable solicitation has largely gone unstudied. In fact, the nonprofit
sector itself has often turned a blind eye to local requirements. Yet, thousands of local
governments impose restrictions on charitable solicitation activities. These restrictions range
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from trivial to severe. Indeed, the findings in this article show that all of the surveyed cities
regulate solicitation in some form. Many cities impose severe burdens on soliciting charities to
apply for a permit, compile and make public detailed information about the organization, and pay
fees. These laws often apply to solicitation that occurs by any means—including mail, telephone,
email, and/or through the internet—even when the organization has no other presence in the city.
For example, Columbus (Ohio) requires all charitable organizations to apply for a permit at least
30 days before soliciting residents. Although this law has been on the books for years, the city
amended the law in 2017 to make it explicit that the requirements apply to solicitation by any
means—“by mail, email or any other written or electronically published article, or over radio,
television, telephone or telegraph” (Columbus Ord. 525.15). Additionally, all organizations
soliciting in the city must fill out a six-page application that is unique to Columbus. These
organizations must also provide supporting documents and pay a filing fee. Over a recent 18month period, more than 400 organizations obtained a permit to solicit donations in Columbus.
Many of these organizations, however, were located in other states. Still, all of the organizations
will be required to reapply for a soliciting permit each year. They will also be required to submit a
yearly report describing the amount of funds that they raised.
Even though enforcement action against noncomplying charities is rare (Fishman, 2015), cautious
or dutiful organizations may expend considerable effort to learn of their legal obligations in each
locale. This could add up for organizations. For instance, a national campaign with a broad donor
base that seeks to comply with all legal obligations would need to verify laws in thousands of cities
and adhere to the regulations each city imposes. As a new wave of constitutional challenges to the
regulation of charitable solicitation emerge and questions persist about the effectiveness of other
forms of regulation, cities may start to take a fresh look at their role in regulating solicitation in
the nonprofit sector.
Background
Layers of Regulation Regarding Nonprofit Activity
Most scholarship about the policy context in which nonprofits operate in the United States begins
and ends at either the federal or the state level. At the federal level, the Internal Revenue Service’s
(IRS) administration of tax-exempt status for organizations provides one of the most highly
visible modes of control over the nonprofit sector. On the other hand, states supply the governing
principles of incorporation and board duties.
Debates about the proper level of government to regulate the nonprofit sector, therefore, have
usually been framed within the context of either federal or state governments (as well as
appropriate types of enforcement agencies) (Freemont-Smith, 2004). For example, some scholars
have called for more uniformity in how nonprofits are regulated by centralizing more functions,
such as more coordination between states and the IRS or the establishment of an independent
regulatory agency (Freemont-Smith, 2004; Mayer, 2016; Mayer & Wilson, 2010; Nave, 2004).
Others have noted that there has been an unceasing march toward federalization of nonprofit
regulation (Ascher, 2014; Fishman, 2009; Hopkins, 1980; Silber, 2005).
The bulk of this literature on nonprofit regulation offers little discussion of the local context.
However, local government regulation of charities can significantly affect the day-to-day
operations of many nonprofits. Some of the more common local regulations include payments in
lieu of taxes (PILOTs) (Brody, 2010; Fei, Hines, & Horwitz, 2016; Grønbjerg, McGiverin-Bohan,
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Dula, & Miller, 2016; McGiverin-Bohan, Grønbjerg, Dula, & Miller, 2016), programmatic choices
or requirements for government funding or grants (Farrell, Fyffe, & Valero, 2015; Fyall, 2017;
Pettijohn, Boris, & Farrell, 2016), and public-private partnerships (Mendel & Brudney, 2012).
Less studied aspects of local regulation include nonprofit specific zoning codes or land use
controls targeting charitable activities (Galvan, 2006).
Of course, nonprofits influence policy as well and the effects of this influence can be most dramatic
at the local level (Mosley & Grogan, 2013). Thus, the tendency for scholarship on nonprofit policy
to focus exclusively on federal and state regulations leaves a gap in our understanding of local
level impacts.
Federalism of Charitable Solicitation
Historically in the US regulation of individual solicitation (i.e., begging) has taken place in various
forms for centuries (Quigley, 1996, 1997). However, regulation of organizational solicitation is a
more recent occurrence given that this type of solicitation was far less common in the United
States until the twentieth century (Barber, 2011, 2017; Cutlip, 1990; Hopkins, 1980). As
professional fundraising became more common and concerns about fraud and excessive costs
emerged, local restrictions were put in place (Cutlip, 1990). Following World War II, and
prompted by concerns of fraudulent or inefficient charities, states began adopting laws to register
and restrict charitable solicitation (Barber, 2011).
One approach that states adopted was placing caps on the amount of money that soliciting
charities could spend on fundraising. These caps were common starting in the 1970s but were
declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court in a trilogy of decisions in the 1980s (Harris,
Holley, & McCaffrey, 1990; Inazu, 2009). In lieu of outright prohibitions on organizations
soliciting donations, states sought to require that solicitors disclose certain information to the
state and, upon request, to the individuals they were soliciting. States also started targeting
particularly egregious cases of fraud by telemarketers under generic state consumer protection
laws.
Since then, charitable solicitation laws have stood relatively unchanged. This is despite advances
in technology and shifts in giving behavior (Child, 2016). Indeed, the rise of webpages, email, and
social media have all changed the way that donations are now sought and received (Maloney &
Rosenthal, 2017). Trends in crowdfunding and peer-to-peer donations, along with other changes
to the charitable sector (including the rise of for-profit, hybrid, and social enterprise forms of
charity), have left state charitable solicitation rules—some of which still regulate fundraising by
telegraph—somewhat outdated.
Despite these few attempts to regulate charitable solicitation at the federal level, the federal
government has mostly taken a hands-off approach to dealing with charitable solicitation
(Fishman, 2015). For example, the pressures of World War II led to national regulation
concerning charities that sought relief related to the war (Barber, 2017). And, in the 1990s, the
IRS attempted to revoke the tax-exempt status of an organization that spent an excessive amount
(in the IRS’s view) on fundraising. On appeal, however, while sending the dispute back to the tax
court the appellate court concluded that the tax code’s prohibition on private inurement did
“not…empower the IRS to monitor the terms of arm’s length contracts made by charitable
organizations with the firms that supply them with essential inputs, whether premises, paper,
computers, legal advice, or fundraising services” (United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 1999, p.
1176).
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has also made only a light foray into regulating charitable
solicitation; and, these regulations have only focused on telemarketing by commercial entities.
Specifically, commercial telemarketers must respect the national do-not-call registry and they are
prohibited from engaging in fraud. These FTC regulations, though, do not pertain to charitable
organizations at large (Cain, 2004). Several proposed bills that would have expanded federal
oversight of charitable solicitation have died in Congress over the years (Hopkins & Kirkpatrick,
2013); and, other than these modest federal forays into the regulation of charitable solicitation,
charitable solicitation has largely not been under federal regulation.
Limits to the Regulation of Charitable Solicitation
Aggressive and selective enforcement of charitable solicitation has prompted courts to intervene.
The US Supreme Court, for example, has upheld the finding that charitable solicitation is
protected free speech. Based on several decisions between 1940 and 1990, the Court somewhat
limited the policy options available to any level of government seeking to regulate charitable
solicitation. The Court did so by first establishing that governmental disagreement with an
organization’s mission or how it accomplishes that mission does not allow it to prevent that
organization’s solicitation of donations (although under some circumstances governments can
modify the tax treatment of donations) (Bray, Hasey, & Hensley, 2017). The one possible
exception to this rule allows government to outlaw solicitation by organizations that finance
terrorism (Bell, 2007). Secondly, as noted above, the Supreme Court has also rejected statutory
caps that prohibit organizations from seeking donations if they have excessive fundraising
expenses (Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 1988). Third, the Court has upheld limits to
which types of disclosures government can require at the time of solicitation (Harris et al., 1990).
Every state has the power to prohibit misleading or fraudulent solicitation. However, uncovering
and then prosecuting fraud is often difficult; and, staff capacity and political constraints tend to
limit the effectiveness of this power (Lott et al., 2016; Sullivan, 2004). In response, state
governments have enacted a mix of mandates on charities that solicit in their state. These
mandates—such as registration, financial reports, and disclosures to donors—often fall along the
outer edge of what the Constitution allows.
Rationales for Regulating Charitable Solicitation
As shown in Table 1, scholarship on government regulation of charitable solicitation can be
grouped into three categories based on regulatory objective: 1) to empower donors to make more
informed decisions with their donations, 2) to ensure that donated funds reach the intended
beneficiary, and/or 3) to advance an interest of government or a government official rather than
the charitable sector (Barber & Farwell, 2016a; Breen, 2009; Irvin, 2005).
Empowering Donors. Requiring organizations to submit registration forms, in theory, provides
donors with an opportunity to access accurate information from which they can base their
donative decisions. Similarly, point-of-solicitation disclosure requirements provide potential
donors with relevant information about soliciting charities and allows them to exercise judgment
before writing a check (Barber & Farwell, 2016b).
One might question whether increased donor control over organizations is beneficial for the
nonprofit sector (Ostrander, 2007) or whether donors even make wise giving choices at all
(Steinberg & Morris, 2010). Even assuming the worthiness of the goal of increased donor control,
there has been mixed empirical evidence that regulations or disclosure requirements actually
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Table 1. Regulatory Objectives of Charitable Solicitation Regulations
Regulatory
Objective
Problem
Policy Response

Empowering
Donors

Empowering
Regulators to
Catch Fraud

Donors lack
knowledge to make
informed decision

False or faithless
agent

Donations to out-ofstate organizations
reduce funds available
for domestic causes
Benefitting
Government

Require disclosure of
relevant info at the time
of solicitation
Require central
disclosure and make
information publicly
available
Require disclosure to
state on how money is
spent
Enforce laws against
fraudulent statements
and divert charitable
resources
Mandate organizational
oversight over agents
(e.g., contract terms,
additional reporting,
background checks)
Impose onerous
registration requirements

Generate revenue for
State Treasury

Charge and collect fees

Many top state charity
officials seek higher
political office

High profile enforcement
against unpopular target
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Assumptions/Limitations
• Assumes disclosure is clear and
relevant
• Assumes motives of donors
• First Amendment limits what can be
required
• Assumes disclosed information will
reach donors
• Assumes information is not more
easily obtained elsewhere
• Assumes report provides sufficient
information to assess whether
solicited funds have reached the
target
• Difficult to uncover and prove

• Difficult to enforce
• Raises constitutional issues regarding
free speech
• Assumes out of state organizations
will be deterred
• Requirements cannot be more
burdensome on out of state charities
• In-state organizations also suffer
• Assumes fees will be paid and exceed
costs of administering the program
• Assumes that the target of
enforcement will be
unfairly/undeservedly selected over
more culpable targets

Sources
Barber &
Farwell, 2016a,
b; Breen, 2009;
Steinberg, 1988
Barber, 2013;
Barber &
Farwell, 2016a,
b; Breen, 2009
Fishman, 2015
Chisolm, 1995;
Fishman, 2007;
Helge, 2009
Koutoujian,
2012
Barber &
Farwell, 2016b;
Irvin, 2005;
Nave, 2004;
Irvin, 2005
Brody, 2004;
Irvin, 2005
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lead to changes in donor behavior (Barber & Farwell, 2016a; Brown, Meer, & Williams, 2017;
Cnaan, Jones, Dickin, & Salomon, 2011; Irvin, 2005; Portillo & Stinn, 2018; Sloan, 2009; Yörük
2016). Following a review of empirical literature, one author concluded, “It strains credulity that
a preponderance of donors would do the necessary research on a charity’s cost structure before
writing a check…Most persons probably trust their instincts because they know the organization
or have heard about its work” (Bowman, 2006, p. 294). Nevertheless, disclosure of information
may have an effect at the margins particularly when these disclosures occur prior to major gifts.
Empowering Regulators to Catch Fraud. A less common justification for solicitation registration
requirements is that they provide information to regulators that facilitates enforcement against
fraudulent organizations (Breen, 2013). The filed information either allows the regulator to
uncover and spot fraud and illegal activity or it assists with additional investigations in the event
that a complaint is brought to the regulator’s attention. Scholars have found little evidence,
though, suggesting that registration aids enforcement of other laws; and, regulators have not
articulated the precise way that the information disclosed aids detection of criminal activity. It is
not even clear that the filings are read by anyone. As Fishman (2015) suggests, “Registration is
not synonymous with enforcement of the law, oversight by the attorney general or prevention of
fraud. Forms, once filed, are not reviewed in most jurisdictions until and unless there are
complaints about a particular charity” (p. 16). Moreover, lax enforcement of charitable solicitation
laws is not surprising given that there are only 355 full-time employee equivalent state level
charity officials nationwide (Lott et al., 2016).
Benefitting Government. Another rationale for regulatory actions taken toward charities is to
benefit government as an institution rather than the charitable sector. For example, there may be
a benefit resulting from government fees. These fees could be collected with at least a partial goal
of raising revenue. Indeed, although most annual fees for registration are relatively modest, some
states charge a substantial amount. For instance, Massachusetts charges the largest nonprofits
more than $2,000 to register for a charitable solicitation permit (Harbor Compliance, 2016). It is
unlikely, though, that this potential for revenue generation actually motivates any state to impose
a registration requirement.
Another benefit might occur if government decides to limit solicitation by organizations whose
efforts benefit residents from other states. This limit may be imposed under concerns that this
type of solicitation may reduce the amount of charitable funds available for their own citizenry.
However, expressly favoring in-state organizations to out-of-state organizations is likely illegal
(Liazos, 2000). While some states impose minor residential requirements (such as having an instate resident agent) and several states have refused to sign onto uniform multi-registration
platforms that would make it easier for organizations from other jurisdictions to comply with the
law, there is little direct evidence that solicitation laws are driven by an interest in protectionism.
Costs of Regulating Charitable Solicitation
Against unproven benefits, scholars have noted that compliance with charitable solicitation
regulations carries real costs (e.g., Freemont-Smith, 2004). These scholars have estimated that
the annual financial burden placed on soliciting nonprofits that comply with state level solicitation
laws could reach as high $150,000 for some organizations (Irvin, 2005). This cost does not simply
include registration fees, but it also includes staff time and other costs associated with learning
the rules each city has and ensuring compliance by all board members, staff, and volunteers who
might solicit donations.
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Exacerbating the cost to charities are the nuances of laws between states. A charity soliciting
donations nationally must comply with the laws in every state, which can include registration and
reporting requirements and ensuring that the language that each state mandates is included in all
solicitations. Although state laws have similar features, charities must carefully determine the
distinct rules in every state to ensure compliance.
Methods
To determine the extent to which local regulation of charitable solicitation activity exists, I
undertook a review of the laws of the 49 largest cities in the United States (drawn from the largest
50 cities in the country, but excluding San Juan, Puerto Rico). The cities were identified using the
2010 U.S. Census of the Population (see Table 2). Reviewing each city’s codified ordinances, I
identified all restrictions on charitable solicitation that existed in each city. I focused only on
ordinances that targeted charitable solicitation directly. Laws that incidentally regulated
charitable solicitation were not included in this review. For example, a law prohibiting standing
on a sidewalk would prohibit standing and soliciting donations, but it would not be included in
this review because it does not target soliciting directly.
Relevant laws were identified by conducting a full-text search of each sampled city’s codified
ordinances for the following truncated words: “solicit!”, “donat!”, “charit!”, and “contribution!.”
The use of truncated words allows for the identification of all words made by adding letters to the
end of it. Trained research assistants searched through the results to identify relevant sections.
The author, an attorney with experience in municipal law, reviewed the findings of the research
assistants. The attorney also conducted an independent search to ensure that all laws were
properly coded and that no other relevant laws were missing. Information about when an
ordinance was enacted was taken from the compiler’s notes.
Findings
Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation
All of the cities in this review regulate charitable solicitation in some way. Some impose strict or
cumbersome regulations such as registration requirements or restrictions on where, when, and
how solicitation can be conducted. Some of these mandates duplicate requirements that already
exist at the state level, while others go far beyond state equivalents. For example, nearly 20% of
the cities (n=9) require that organizations soliciting donations by any means (whether telephone,
mail, advertisement, and/or electronically) register with the city beforehand. Nearly 20% of the
cities also require that organizations soliciting by roadside or in public spaces register to solicit
donations. All but two of the cities have location restrictions that limit soliciting donations in
certain parts of the city.
Registration. A handful of the cities (see Table 3) require organizations to register with the city
(typically the Chief of Police) before soliciting donations. These requirements largely echo those
commonly found at the state level. Several cities also impose requirements before allowing
solicitation in public places (e.g., New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Antonio, Jacksonville, San
Francisco, Fort Worth, and Charlotte), door-to-door (e.g., Nashville), or near roadways (e.g.,
Jacksonville and San Antonio). Although excluded from Table 3, a few cities have additional
nuances to their requirements. These nuances include things like requiring registration for
solicitation in government buildings, airports, or transit systems (e.g., Miami) or requiring
registration for solicitation raising funds for specific causes like law enforcement (e.g., New York).
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Table 2. City Restrictions on Charitable Solicitation
Sidewalk
Roadside
City
State
Solicitation
Solicitation
New York
NY
X
Los Angeles
CA
X
Chicago
IL
X
Houston
TX
X
X
Philadelphia
PA
X
Phoenix
AZ
X
X
San Antonio
TX
X
X
San Diego
CA
X
Dallas
TX
X
X
San Jose
CA
X
Jacksonville
FL
X
X
Indianapolis
IN
X
X
San Francisco
CA
X
Austin
TX
X
X
Columbus
OH
X
X
Fort Worth
TX
X
X
Charlotte
NC
X
X
Detroit
MI
X
El Paso
TX
X
X
Memphis
TN
X
Baltimore
MD
X
Boston
MA
X
Seattle
WA
X
Washington
DC
X
X
Nashville
TN
X
X
Denver
CO
X
X
Louisville
KY
X
X
Milwaukee
WI
X
Portland
OR
X
Las Vegas
NV
X
X
Oklahoma City
OK
X
X
Albuquerque
NM
X
Tucson City
AZ
X
X
Fresno City
CA
X
X
Sacramento
CA
X
X
Long Beach
CA
X
X
Kansas City
MO
X
X
Mesa City
AZ
Virginia Beach
VA
X
Atlanta
GA
X
Colorado Springs
CO
X
Omaha City
NE
X
X
Raleigh
NC
X
Miami
FL
X
Cleveland
OH
Tulsa
OK
X
X
Oakland
CA
X
X
Minneapolis
MN
X
X
Wichita
KS
X
Total
44
29
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Door-to-Door
Solicitation

Donation
Bins

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

6
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Table 3. Local Charitable Solicitation Registration Requirements
City
New York, NY
Admin. Code 21-111
Los Angeles, CA
Ord. 44.04

Means Covered
In public or house-tohouse
Any means however
exempts individuals
soliciting for
themselves
Roadside

Exemptions
Religious organizations

Houston, TX
Ord. 36-71
San Antonio, TX
Ord. 19-8

Face-to-face or
telephone
Roadside

Soliciting from existing
members
None

Jacksonville, FL
§804.807

Roadside

None

San Francisco, CA
Police Code Art. 9.6

Public spaces

Columbus, OH
Ord. 525.02

Any means however
exempts individuals
soliciting for
themselves
Professional
fundraisers
Roadside

Individuals, soliciting
members, on personal
property, for political
purposes
Religious organizations
and schools, to members,
for less than $500 per year

Chicago, IL
Ord. 10-8-080

Columbus, OH
Ord. 525.21
Fort Worth, TX
Ord. 30-7
Memphis, TN
6-64-3

Any means

Soliciting from existing
members
None

None
None
Houses of worship
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Registration Requirements
Names of all directors and officers; cost
of fundraising.
Must be filed 15 days before start; must
contain information about purpose of
funds, activities used, and costs.

First
Recently
Enacted Amended
1925
1999
*

2003

1984

2010

2005

2008

1990

2005

2002

2016

1987

1990

Must be filed 30 days in advance;
separate permitting for roadside.

1959

2017

Information about the solicitor and the
plan of solicitation; a bond.
Only two days per year; must have
approved signs and an insurance policy;
all solicitors must be 18 years old.
“...all such information…as may be of
assistance to the board in determining
whether the permit shall be given;”
requires a “proper proportion” of
money go to cause.

1959

2017

1964

2011

1967

1985

Must be filed 30 days in advance;
prohibits individuals soliciting for
themselves.
Must be filed 10 days in advance.
Requires insurance, knowledge of first
aid, and $200 filing fee; limited to 2
days per year.
Only allowed twice per year; requires
insurance; all funds must go to a state
licensed nonprofit.
Must file statement of registration with
extensive financials; each solicitor must
carry a registration card.
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District of Columbia
Code 44-1701 et seq.

Any means

Louisville, KY
Chapter 117

Any means

Las Vegas, NV
Chapter 11.62

Roadside

Las Vegas, NV
Chapter 6.78

Event promotion by
professional

None

Oklahoma City, OK
Ord. Ch. 13, Art. II
Albuquerque, NM
Ch. 13, Art. X

Any means

Soliciting from members

Professional
fundraiser

None

Fresno City, CA
Ch. 9, Art. 7
Long Beach, CA
Ch. 5.28

Professional
fundraiser
Any means except on
personal property
and exempts
individuals soliciting
for themselves
Any means

None

Virginia Beach, VA
26-50
Oakland, CA
5.18.050

Any means

Religious organizations,
soliciting from members,
American Red Cross
Houses of worship,
soliciting only from
members, certain
educational solicitations
None

Religious organizations

Organizations registered
with state, several other
categories
Soliciting members
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Registration form; solicitors must carry
cards.

1957

2017

Registration form with detailed info
(including social security numbers) on
solicitors as well as time and location
of solicitation.
Five business days in advance; street
address of organization; proof that
organization has 501(c)(3) tax exempt
status; agreement to indemnify city.
Information about all events promoted;
descriptions of events; payment of all
inspection costs at hourly rate.
Registration form every three months.

1991

2003

1991

1991

1984

2015

1980

1993

1970

2007

1983

1983

1986

2010

Names and addresses of directors;
address information for organization.

1965

2017

Statement that costs will not exceed 16%
of direct gifts; statement that no one will
be paid to conduct telephone
solicitation; detailed financial
information; statement of need for
donations.

1956

1974

Plan to solicit; information about
criminal records of employees; filing a
bond; must disclose amount spent on
fundraiser to potential donors.
Terms of compensation; period of
soliciting.
File authorization for each solicitor with
police dept; requires permit with
fingerprints of paid solicitors.
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Means Covered. The broadest solicitation laws require any organization soliciting donations from
a city resident to register—without specifying method of contact. Los Angeles, for example,
requires registration for “[a]ny oral or written request for a charitable contribution made,
transmitted, or distributed by any means,” except that it exempts emails and websites in some
instances (Ord. § 44.01). Similarly, Columbus registers charitable solicitation by any means
“either directly or indirectly” (Ord. § 525.01). In 2017, the city added language to clarify explicitly
that its registration requirements apply to email, social media, and mass media solicitations
(while continuing to cover telephone and telegraph) (Ord. § 525.15). Houston in contrast limits
the scope of its charitable solicitation registration requirements to in-person and telephone
requests that take place within city limits (Ord. § 36-71). Other cities (e.g., New York) only require
registration when solicitation takes place in person.
Although state laws imposing extensive regulations on professional fundraisers are common, a
few cities (e.g., Columbus, Fresno, and Albuquerque) have similar laws. With these exceptions,
cities do not mimic state laws that impose heightened burdens on professional fundraising firms.
Exemptions. Like their state counterparts, city registration rules often exempt religious
organizations and those that solicit exclusively from members. Although, specific requirements
can vary. However, unlike state level registration requirements that often exempt smaller
organizations, the cities in the present review have no such exemption for organizations with
small amounts of revenue.
Notably, most of the cities that impose broad registration requirements are located in states that
have similar state level requirements. These requirements may have been established without
considering the state level mandates. Only one city exempts organizations that are registered at
the state level (Virginia Beach), while another (Louisville) requires organizations registered with
the state to re-sign and submit the state registration form to the city. Many of the other cities
impose extensive registration and regulatory requirements on organizations—even when those
same organizations are regulated at the state level.
Scope of Requirements. Of the cities that require registration, most mandate that nonprofits file
information about organizational finances, particularly how much revenue is anticipated and how
much will be spent on the solicitation. This often must be done 10 to 30 days in advance of the
solicitation. Some of the cities require the intended use of the funds to be specified. A few of the
cities require detailed information about the people affiliated with the organization. Some, for
example, require names and addresses of directors. Others require disclosure of criminal history
of anyone involved with the solicitation. Additionally, some of the cities require nonprofits to
submit the text of their solicitations. A few of the cities even request more specific information.
Oakland, for example, requires an assurance that the costs of the solicitation will not exceed 16%.
Cities that also restrict roadside solicitation often have insurance requirements and require
disclosure of the exact day(s), time(s), and location(s) of the solicitation.
Enforcement and Use. Scholars have found little evidence of vigorous enforcement of charitable
solicitation laws at the state level (Fishman, 2015). The same is likely true at the local level.
Columbus, for example, has a Charitable Solicitation Board as well as at least one staff member
devoted to charitable solicitation. Yet, the city indicated in response to a public record request
that it had undertaken no enforcement actions in the prior two years despite hundreds of
organizations registering with the city. Indeed, from January 1, 2015 to July 12, 2017 there were
402 organizations that received a charitable solicitation permit from the City of Columbus. No
organization that applied during this time was denied a permit. Interestingly, since this time there
has been no organization prosecuted for failure to comply.
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A review of the webpages of the cities in this article shows that Washington, DC is the only locale
that provides electronic access to registration forms (for prior use of this methodology, see Barber,
2013). For most of the cities, information filed by charities must be requested via a written public
records request along with payment of copying and processing fees. These burdens associated
with accessing information make it unlikely that potential donors will benefit from the
information provided.
Regulating Public Solicitations
Only a handful of the cities in this review have broad registration requirements, but almost every
city has some spatial restrictions on solicitation. Ordinances that restrict charitable solicitation
activities according to space or location typically fall into three categories. First, nearly all of the
cities regulate solicitation in public places such as sidewalks or parks, restricting or even banning
solicitation in some areas. Second, some laws restrict standing on roadways with the intent to
communicate with passing motorists. Although the present review captures only cities that
regulate solicitation expressly, some of the cities also rely on laws intended to prohibit loitering
on public medians to limit roadside solicitation (Cutting v. Portland Maine, 2015). Finally, many
local governments have laws regulating door-to-door “peddlers,” which is a term that has
sometimes been defined to include solicitation. These laws require solicitor registration and they
also limit the hours of solicitation activities. As the number of solicitors traveling house-to-house
has decreased, though, these laws have become somewhat archaic and are rarely invoked.
Sidewalks and Solicitation Free Zones. Almost every city in this review has some restrictions on
in-person solicitation on sidewalks. Two exceptions are Cleveland (which repealed its sidewalk
solicitation ordinance in mid-2017 following a lawsuit) and Virginia Beach (which repealed its
ordinance in early 2018 out of concerns that it was unconstitutional). These laws are often titled
“panhandling” or “aggressive solicitation” laws. They typically work by establishing 10, 20, or even
50-foot buffer zones around certain places such as the entrances to buildings, parking structures,
intersections, bus stops, and parks.
Other cities create “solicitation free zones.” These zones are usually in downtown business
districts (e.g., Atlanta Ord. 106-85 and Memphis Ord. 6-56-3). Memphis also prohibits sitting on
a bench while soliciting (Ord. 6-56-5); and, both Memphis and Seattle outlaw soliciting anywhere
in a public park (Memphis Ord. 12-84-10 and Seattle Ord. 18.12.150).
Laws against soliciting on transit systems and on airport property are also common. Although no
city in this review followed a total ban approach, an earlier survey found that several smaller cities
nationwide have banned face-to-face solicitations (National Law Center on Homelessness &
Poverty, 2014). Such a citywide ban, though, has never survived a judicial challenge (Speet v.
Schuette, 2013).
Many solicitation laws that focus on sidewalks and the creation of solicitation free zones also often
contain restrictions on the manner in which solicitations can be conducted. Common prohibitions
include bans on “abusive” comments (e.g., Boston Ord. 16-41), bans on asking someone to
reconsider a “no” response (e.g., San Antonio Ord. Art. I, 21-29), and restrictions on the time of
day that solicitations can occur. Some prohibit children from soliciting (e.g., Detroit Ord. 33-4-5),
while others prohibit groups of two or more from soliciting (e.g., Denver Ord. 38-132 and
Minneapolis Ord. 385.60). Solicitation in these laws is usually defined as a request for an
immediate donation by any means. There are some exempt nonverbal solicitations (e.g., when
solicitors merely hold a sign).
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Although these laws lack an explicit exemption for nonprofit solicitation, it is possible that law
enforcement officials may target individual solicitors (i.e., panhandlers) rather than individuals
working on behalf of an organized charity. In fact, many solicitation laws are labelled as
ordinances targeting “panhandling,” which is behavior typically associated with individual
solicitation rather than nonprofits. However, as one court noted:
While the plaintiff here has focused the inquiry on the effects of the
ordinance on the poor and homeless, the ordinance itself is not so
limited. It applies with equal force to anyone who would solicit a
charitable contribution, whether for a recognized charity, a
religious group, a political candidate or organization, or for an
individual. It would punish street people as well as Salvation Army
bell ringers outside stores at Christmas, so long as the appeal
involved a vocal request for an immediate donation. (Gresham v.
Peterson, 2000, p. 903)
Over the years, there have been legal challenges to restrictions on sidewalk solicitation (Loper v.
New York, 1993). In the 20 years from 1995 to 2015, federal courts across the country reached
differing conclusions about the constitutionality of soliciting on sidewalks. However, after
Supreme Court decisions in 2014 and 2015 clarified the legal standard in First Amendment cases,
courts began striking down restrictions on sidewalk solicitations consistently whenever they were
challenged (Barmore, 2016; Lauriello, 2016; Mead, 2015). Still, as seen in Table 3, restrictions on
sidewalk solicitations remain common (44 of the 49 cities in this review place restrictions on
sidewalk solicitations).
Roadside Solicitations. Although not as common as restrictions on sidewalk solicitations, many
of the cities (29 out of the 49) restrict or ban roadside solicitations. Complete bans are a common
approach (e.g., Indianapolis Ord. 407-102 and Charlotte 14-282). However, some of the cities,
like San Jose, prohibit roadside solicitations only in certain high traffic areas designated as no
solicitation zones.
A few of the cities allow roadside solicitations but impose extensive limits. Jacksonville, for
example, prohibits roadside solicitations without a permit. Moreover, the city will only issue such
a permit to a nonprofit organization registered with the state (Ord. 804.807). In addition to this
prohibition , the organization must provide proof of a million dollar insurance policy and may not
solicit more than two days at a time (or two times in a year). Individuals under 21 years of age are
not allowed to participate in roadside solicitations in the city; and, all roadside solicitations in
Jacksonville must take place during the day.
Kansas City has similar restrictions but also requires signs to be placed around the solicitation as
well as the presence of a police officer at all times (Ord. 50-8.5). Las Vegas also has similar
requirements but will only issue a permit to an organization that is federally tax-exempt (Ord. §
11.62.020). In the past few years, there have been a few successful legal challenges to roadside
solicitation restrictions, particularly when the ban is complete rather than tailored (Barmore,
2016). Still, these ordinances remain common.
Door-to-Door Solicitations. Somewhat narrower are laws that restrict or regulate door-to-door
solicitations. These laws are justified on the basis of privacy interests in one’s residence, safety
concerns that someone might use a door-to-door solicitation as a cover for investigating a criminal
target, and the desire that people have to be left alone in their own homes (e.g., Dallas Ord. 42-1).
Although regulation of door-to-door solicitations is common, only a fraction of the ordinances
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that regulate door-to-door solicitations are specifically intended for charitable purposes. More
common regulations apply to commercial solicitors seeking to sell a product; and, these
regulations often expressly exempt charitable solicitations (e.g., Nashville Ord. 6.64.010).
Ordinances that do include door-to-door charitable solicitations usually limit the time of day a
solicitation can take place. These ordinances also often prohibit solicitors from visiting a residence
that has a “no solicitation” sign displayed. A few cities require solicitors to obtain permits prior to
starting a door-to-door campaign (e.g., Jacksonville Ord. 250.701). A registration requirement
prior to door-to-door canvassing (such as “get-out-the-vote” efforts) was struck down by the
Supreme Court in 2002. The Court however left open the possibility that door-to-door charitable
solicitors could be required to register, provided that the registration was prompt and ministerial
(Watchtower v. Village of Straton, 2002).
Donation Boxes. In recent years, cities have begun regulating unattended donation receptacles
that allow people to donate used clothes and/or other items (Gasseling, 2017). These regulations,
however, are relatively rare compared to the regulation of solicitations conducted by individuals.
Only a few cities in this review (10 out of 49) placed restrictions on where donation receptacles
could be located or imposed permitting requirements. San Antonio, for example, requires permits
for all unattended containers, prohibits placing a container within 200 feet of a residential
property, and limits the size of containers used for donations to four cubic feet (Ord. § 16-913).
Miami prohibits the use of donation bins throughout the city (Ord. § 22-161); and, at least one
city, Charlotte, regulates donation facilities (not just the containers). This city also imposes size
limits on donation bins and requires that bins be monitored while donations are being accepted
(Charlotte Ord. § 12.532.1).
Because donation bins invariably display signage signifying that they are being used for the
purpose of soliciting a donation, organizations that utilize these bins are able to rely on First
Amendment rights. Courts have reached different views, though, regarding the lawfulness of
restrictions on donation receptacles. Some courts have struck down total or overly restrictive bans
but have upheld more limited regulations on receptacle location (Recycle for Change v. City of
Oakland, 2017). In 2014, the Kentucky Attorney General issued a memorandum urging cities to
proceed cautiously when regulating donation receptacles. The Secondary Materials and Recycled
Textiles Association drafted a model ordinance for cities that encourages a permitting system
rather than an outright ban on these receptables (“For Communities,” n.d.).
Discussion
Comparing Local Interests to State
Although some cities have adopted solicitation registration requirements that mirror state
requirements, the bulk of local level regulation of charitable solicitation is driven by spatial
concerns. Indeed, rather than focusing on empowering donors, preventing fraud, or the diversion
of resources, which have been the dominant purposes behind state level charitable solicitation
laws as discussed by others (see Table 1), most city regulations are related much more closely to
traffic flow, avoiding annoyances at people’s homes, or concerns about in-person solicitation in
certain areas. This suggests, then, that although most cities are concerned about charitable
solicitation enough to regulate it, they regulate it differently than states; and, they regulate it for
different reasons than states.
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Interjurisdictional (Non-)Cooperation
It is perhaps a bit surprising that more cities do not coordinate with overlapping state laws when
specifying their regulatory requirements. If the purpose of cities occupying this regulatory space
is to fill a void left by states, then we would expect to see rules that supplement rather than simply
replicate state laws. Instead, we find city ordinances requiring registration are, on their face,
indifferent to the existence of similar state laws. In fact, only a single city in this review explicitly
exempted local filing requirements for organizations that had already registered with the state
(Virginia Beach Chapter 26, Article III). That city’s decision to do so is likely because state law
expressly preempts this type of ordinance (Virginia Code § 57-63).
Instead of coordinating with state law, a few of the cities in this review provide exemptions for
organizations that are federally tax-exempt. For example, federal tax laws have nothing to say
about roadway safety, yet some city laws permit federally tax-exempt organizations to solicit near
roadways due to their federal tax status alone (e.g., Las Vegas Ord. § 11.62.020). It is unclear,
though, why federal tax status is relevant for soliciting donations near roadways. There is also no
obvious explanation as to why a city would rely on federal tax-exempt status to exempt charitable
organizations from solicitation filing requirements rather than an organization’s compliance with
state charitable solicitation registration rules.
Because city registration requirements predate state laws (Freemont-Smith, 2004, p.370), one
explanation could possibility be that cities simply have not undertaken the effort to consider the
role that their laws continue to play in light of similar state requirements. Indeed, local
governments were an early innovator in the regulation of charitable solicitation. Although many
charitable solicitation ordinances for the cities in this review date back to 1980 or earlier, as shown
in Table 3, nearly all of the cities have enacted amendments to their ordinances in recent years.
For example, Columbus undertook major revisions to its registration requirements in 2017. These
revisions included amending the approval process and clarifying that the requirements applied to
electronic forms of solicitation. Despite this revision, the city did not deduplicate or streamline
registration requirements that overlapped with state law. It is possible, then, that cities may be
willing to update their laws but not rethink the major policy choices that led to developing the
regulation in the first place. It is also possible that cities may not be willing to revisit how their
laws fit into the broader regulatory environment. The local legislative processes involved warrant
further exploration beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes, it suffices to observe
that at least some cities maintain and update local registration requirements for charities without
considering the duplication of the requirement.
Indifference to Constitutional Rights of Charities
Although a full analysis of the nuanced constitutional limits to charitable solicitation are beyond
the scope of this article, some of the cities in this review have laws that directly conflict with court
rulings. This finding of constitutional issues is consistent with Hopkins and Kirkpatrick’s (2013,
p. 74) observation that governments continue to enforce many unconstitutional laws against
charities realizing that charities are unlikely to invest the time or money necessary to bring a
successful court challenge. Oakland, for example, refuses to allow any organization to solicit
donations if it spends more than a set percentage (16% of direct gifts) on the solicitation. The city
does so even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down similar provisions (Riley v.
National Federation for the Blind of North Carolina, 1988). Notably, Oakland also has not
amended its solicitation law in nearly forty years.
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Other cities allow officials wide discretion to decide what information must be supplied by
organizations and whether a permit should be granted (e.g., Memphis and Columbus). These
allowances run afoul of decades of Supreme Court cases (Cox v. Louisiana, 1965; City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 1988). Finally, city restrictions for soliciting on sidewalks
have not survived a court challenge in several years, yet these laws remain on the books in nearly
every city. However, some cities have begun to repeal laws regulating charitable solicitation. In
2017, Wichita repealed its law requiring a permit before allowing roadside soliciting.
By maintaining laws that are susceptible to court challenge, it may seem that cities are
disinterested in ensuring the constitutional integrity of their laws or taking proactive steps to
respect constitutional rights of charities in their cities (Vogelsang-Coombs, 2012). However, in
light of the increasing amount of constitutional litigation over solicitation laws at the local level,
cities may want to consider whether the benefits of their registration requirements and other
regulations are warranted when compared to the potential costs imposed on nonprofits and on
city officials. A closer examination of constitutional rules is a fruitful topic for future study.
Conclusion
This article adds to the literature by revealing the existence and extent of local regulation of
charitable solicitation. Much of the existing scholarly literature has overlooked the local
dimension of regulating charitable solicitation. However, a law overlooked by scholars is still a
law and nonprofits are expected to follow it.
Because enforcement of laws regulating the nonprofit sector is notoriously lax at the federal and
state levels (Fishman, 2015), the potential oversight exercised by local governments could fill a
gap left by these other entities. With overlapping regulation, though, comes new costs for
charities. Indeed, compliance with innumerable local regulations (in addition to similar state
laws) could pose a significant barrier to nonprofits when attempting to communicate their
mission to potential supporters.
For cities, then, this article highlights the need for officials to think carefully about the benefits
and costs associated with different forms of charitable solicitation regulation at the local level,
particularly when considering regulatory efforts conducted by other levels of government. As
cities continue to update and amend their charitable solicitation laws—and as a new wave of
constitutional challenges to charitable solicitation laws emerge—my hope is that future research
will continue to grow our understanding of the local regulation of charities.
Disclosure Statement
The author(s) declare that there are no conflicts of interest that relate to the research, authorship,
or publication of this article. The author, however, was personally involved in the repeal of
Cleveland’s sidewalk solicitation ordinance.
References
Ascher, M. L. (2014). Federalization of the Law of Charity. Vanderbilt Law Review, 67(6), 1581.

1 3

Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs
Barber, P. (2011). Regulation of US charitable solicitations since 1954. Voluntas: International
Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations, 23, 737-762.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-011-9235-z
Barber, P. (2013, February). The official word: What state charities webpages tell the public.
Presented at The Future of Charities Regulation and Enforcement, Columbia Law
School. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.7916/D8348H9M
Barber, P. (2017). Muddy waters: Cross currents in fundraising and its control: 1907-1954.
Nonprofit Policy Forum, 8, 275-298. https://doi.org/10.1515/npf-2017-0007
Barber, P., & Farwell, M. M. (2016a). Charitable solicitations regulation and the principles of
regulatory disclosure. Nonprofit Policy Forum, 7, 311-338. https://doi.org/10.1515/npf2015-0017
Barber, P., & Farwell, M. M. (2016b). The relationship between state and nonstate interventions
in charitable solicitation law in the United States. In O. B. Breen, A. Dunn, & M. Sidel
(Eds.), Regulatory waves: Comparative perspectives on state regulation and selfregulation policies in the nonprofit sector. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Barmore, C. (2016). Panhandling after McCullen v. Coakley. Nevada Law Journal, 16, 585-624.
Bell, J. L. (2007). Terrorist abuse of non-profit and charities: A proactive approach to
preventing terrorist financing. Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy, 17, 450-476.
Bowman, W. (2006). Should donors care about overhead costs? Do they care? Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 35, 288-310. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764006287219
Bray, D., Hasey, S., & Hensley, C. (2017). Proposed fundraising bills in Oklahoma and Missouri
would unconstitutionally target animal rights charities. Syracuse Law Review, 67, 217239.
Breen, O. B. (2009). Regulating charitable solicitation practices: The search for a hybrid
solution. Financial Accountability & Management, 25, 115-143.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0408.2008.00468.x
Breen, O. B. (2013). The disclosure panacea: A comparative perspective on charity financial
reporting. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations,
24, 852-880. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-013-9377-2
Brody, E. (2004). Whose public? Parochialism and paternalism in state charity law
enforcement. Indiana Law Journal, 79, 937-1036.
Brown, A. L., Meer, J., & Williams, J. F. (2017). Social distance and quality ratings in charity
choice. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 66, 9-15,
https://doi.org/10.3386/w20182
Brody, E. (2010). All charities are property-tax exempt, but some charities are more exempt
than others. New England Law Review, 44(3), 621-732.
Cain, R. M. (2004). Nonprofit solicitation under the telemarketing sales rule. Federal
Communications Law Journal, 57(1), 81-105.
Child, C. (2016). Tip of the iceberg: The nonprofit underpinnings of for-profit social enterprise.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 45, 217-237.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764015572901
Chisolm, L. B. (1995). Accountability of nonprofit organizations and those who control them:
The legal framework. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 6, 141-156.
https://doi.org/10.1002/nml.4130060204
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
Cnaan, R. A., Jones, K., Dickin, A., & Salomon, M. (2011). Nonprofit watchdogs: Do they serve
the average donor? Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 21, 381-397.
https://doi.org/10.1002/nml.20032
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
Cutlip, S. M. (1990). Fundraising in the United States: Its role in America’s philanthropy. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

1 4

Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation
Cutting v. City of Portland, Maine, 802 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2015).
Dietz, N., Barber, P., Lott, C., & Shelly, M. (2017). Exploring the relationship between state
charitable solicitation regulations and fundraising performance. Nonprofit Policy
Forum, 8, 183-204. https://doi.org/10.1515/npf-2017-0009
Farrell, M., Fyffe, S. D., & Valero, J. (2015). Nonprofit-government contracts and grants.
Retrieved from http://www.urban.org/Nonprofit-Government-Contracts-and-Grants-ACase-Study-of-Prince-Georges-County-Maryland.pdf
Fei, F., Hines, J. R., & Horwitz, J. R. (2016). Are PILOTs property taxes for nonprofits? Journal
of Urban Economics, 94, 109-123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2016.06.002
Fishman, J. J. (2007). The faithless fiduciary and the quest for charitable accountability, 12002005. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
Fishman, J. J. (2009). Stealth preemption: The IRS’s nonprofit corporate governance initiative.
Virginia Tax Review, 29, 545-592.
Fishman, J. J. (2015). Who can regulate fraudulent charitable solicitation? Pittsburgh Tax
Review, 13, 1-42.
Secondary Materials and Recycled Textiles (n.d.). For communities. Retrieved from
https://www.smartasn.org/resources/for-communities
Freemont-Smith, M. R. (2004). Governing nonprofit organizations: Federal and state law and
regulation. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Fyall, R. (2017). Nonprofits as advocates and providers: A conceptual framework. Policy Studies
Journal, 45, 121-143. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12165
Galvan, S. C. (2006). Beyond worship: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000 and religious institutions’ auxiliary uses. Yale Law and Policy Review, 24(1),
207-239.
Gasseling, K. (2017). The threads of justice: Economic liberalization and the secondhand
clothing trade between the United States and Haiti. Boston College Law Review, 58,
1279-1319.
Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2000).
Grønbjerg, K., McGiverin-Bohan, K., Dula, L., & Miller, R. (2016). Indiana local government
officials: Exploring support for PILOTs (Payments-in-Lieu of Taxes). Retrieved from
http://www.indiana.edu/local-govt-PILOT-attitudes.pdf
Harbor Compliance. (2016). Charitable solicitation compliance. Retrieved from
https://www.harborcompliance.com/fundraising-compliance-white-paper
Harris, E., Holley, L. S., & McCaffrey, C. J. (1990). Fundraising into the 1990s: State regulation
of charitable solicitation after “Riley.” University of San Francisco Law Review, 24(4),
571-652.
Helge, T. L. (2009). Policing the good guys: Regulation of the charitable sector through a federal
charity oversight board. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 19, 1-82.
Hopkins, B. R. (1980). Charity under siege: Government regulation of fundraising. Hoboken,
NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Hopkins, B. R., & Kirkpatrick, A. M. (2013). States’ charitable solicitation acts. In B. R. Hopkins,
& A. M. Kirkpatrick (Eds.), The law of fundraising (pp. 49-90). Hoboken, NJ: John
Wiley & Sons.
Hu, M., & Guo, C. (2016). Fundraising policy reform and its impact on nonprofits in China: A
view from the trenches. Nonprofit Policy Forum, 7, 213-236.
https://doi.org/10.1515/npf-2016-0003
Inazu, J. D. (2009). Making sense of Schaumburg: Seeking coherence in First Amendment
charitable solicitation law. Marquette Law Review, 92(3), 551-589.
Irvin, R. A. (2005). State regulation of nonprofit organizations: Accountability regardless of
outcome. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 34, 161-178.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764004272189

1 5

Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs
Koutoujian, A. (2012). Compulsory burden shifting in California charity law: When convenience
trumps protected speech. Southwestern Law Review, 42, 421-440.
Lauriello, A. D. (2016). Panhandling regulation after Reed v. Town of Gilbert. Columbia Law
Review, 116(4), 1105-1142.
Liazos, M. G. (2000). Can states impose registration requirements on online charitable
solicitors? The University of Chicago Law Review, 67, 1379-1407.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1600461
Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
Lott, C. M., Boris, E. T., Goldman, K. K., Johns, B. J., Gaddy, M., & Farrell, M. (2016). State
regulation and enforcement in the charitable sector. Retrieved from
http://www.urban.org/State-Regulation-and-Enforcement-in-the-Charitable-Sector.pdf
Maloney, M. P., & Rosenthal, D. S. (2017). Charitable organization internet fundraising and
state registration requirements. Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, 29(6),
3-9.
Mayer, L. H., & Wilson, B. M. (2010). Regulating charities in the twenty-first century: An
institutional choice analysis. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 85(2), 479-550.
Mayer, L. M. (2016). Nonprofit oversight under siege: Fragmented oversight of nonprofits in the
United States: Does it work? Can it work? Chicago-Kent Law Review, 91(3), 937-963.
McGiverin-Bohan, K., Grønbjerg, K., Dula, L., & Miller, R. (2016). Local officials’ support for
PILOTs/SILOTs: Nonprofit engagement, economic stress, and politics. Public
Administration Review, 76, 951-963. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12579
Mead, J. (2015). The First Amendment protection of charitable speech. Ohio State Law
Journal: Furthermore, 76, 57-66.
Mendel, S. C., & Brudney, J. L. (2012). Putting the NP in PPP. Public Performance &
Management Review, 35, 617-642. https://doi.org/10.2753/PMR1530-9576350403
Mosley, J. E., & Grogan, C. M. (2013). Representation in nonelected participatory processes:
How residents understand the role of nonprofit community-based organizations.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 23, 839-863.
https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mus043
Nave, C. (2004). Charitable state registration and the Dormant Commerce Clause Exempt
Organization Law. William Mitchell Law Review, 31(1), 227-244.
Ostrander, S. A. (2007). The growth of donor control: Revisiting the social relations of
philanthropy. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 36, 356-372.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764007300386
Pettijohn, S. L., Boris, E. T., & Farrell, M. R. (2016). National study of nonprofit-government
contracts and grants 2013: State profiles. Retrieved from
http://www.urban.org/nonprofit-government-contracts-and-grants-2013-state-profiles
Portillo, J. E. & Stinn, J. (2018). Overhead aversion: Do some types of overhead matter more
than others? Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 72, 40-50,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2017.11.003
Quigley, W. P. (1996). Five hundred years of English Poor Laws, 1349-1834: Regulating the
working and nonworking poor. Akron Law Review, 30, 73-128.
Quigley, W. P. (1997). Reluctant charity: Poor Laws in the original thirteen states. University of
Richmond Law Review, 31(1), 111-178.
Recycle for Change v. City of Oakland, 856 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2017).
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
Silber, N. I. (2005). Nonprofit interjudisdictionality symposium: Who guards the guardians:
Monitoring and enforcement of charity governance. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 80, 613640.

196

Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation
Sloan, M. F. (2009). The effects of nonprofit accountability ratings on donor behavior.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 38, 220-236.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764008316470
Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 2013).
Steinberg, R. (1988). Economic perspective on regulation of charitable solicitation. Case
Western Law Review 39(3), 775.
Steinberg, R., & Morris, D. (2010). Ratio discrimination in charity fundraising: The
inappropriate use of cost ratios has harmful side-effects. Voluntary Sector Review, 1(1),
77-95. https://doi.org/10.1332/204080510X497028
Sullivan, C. R. (2004). Note: Get the balance right: Finding an equilibrium between charitable
solicitation, fraud, and the First Amendment in Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarking
Associates, 538 U.S. 600 (2003). William Mitchell Law Review, 31(1), 277-302.
United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999).
Vogelsang-Coombs, V. (2012). Toward the civil city council. State and Local Government
Review, 44, 208-215. https://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X12457184
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150
(2002).
Yörük, B. K. (2016). Charity ratings. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 25, 195219. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12139
Author Biography
Joseph Mead is an Assistant Professor at Cleveland State University’s Maxine Goodman Levin
College of Urban Affairs and the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.

1 7

